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Abstract 
Community Accountability in Ontario's Hospital Sector: A Case Study of 
Six Hospitals in Ontario 
As the provincial cost of funding healthcare approaches an annual $30 billion, 
both government and the public are demanding greater accountability from 
Ontario's hospitals. Indeed, new legislation has been passed in Ontario to 
require hospital boards to enter into accountability agreements with the Ministry 
of Health. While broadly supporting the intent of The Commitment to the Future 
of Medicare Act, the Ontario Hospital Association (OHA) has warned that key 
sections of the Act will undermine local hospital boards by allowing the 
government to make unilateral decisions about management and patient care 
priorities in each hospital without regard to the oversight responsibilities of local 
volunteer hospital boards. 
The OHA's call for governance renewal to prevent the loss of individual hospital 
autonomy has been premised on the argument that volunteer directors serve as 
a critical link between hospital and communities. This defense raises a 
fundamental question: What is the accountability relationship between 
communities and hospital boards? 
A sample of six hospitals in Ontario is the basis of this study, which examines 
how community accountability is exercised by the governing boards of hospitals. 
Results indicate that hospital boards face a number of tensions and paradoxes 
that stem from directing their efforts towards the organization, government and 
the community. 
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I. Introduction and Research Question 
This research report examines community accountability in public administration, 
specifically in the context of hospital governance. As the annual cost of health 
care in Ontario approaches $30 billion, there are growing demands from both the 
public and government for increased accountability. Hospitals, as multi-faceted, 
pluralistic and publicly-funded organizations, provide an ideal backdrop for an 
analysis and discussion of accountability within a public administration 
framework. The hospital sector perhaps best represents the new and 
increasingly complex governance environment in which governments and 
citizens come together to demand accountability from those who provide public 
goods and services. 
"Public accountability is a fundamental right of citizens in a 
democratic polity. Without accountability, democracy does not 
work: there is no constraint on the arbitrary exercise of authority. 
But accountability is difficult to construct and enforce, even in 
democratic systems of responsible government. Accountability is 
even more challenging when states turn to markets for public 
goods, when the powers of the state are delegated and authority 
is one step or further removed. What accountability means, how it 
is constructed, and what measures are important are part of a 
much larger conversation about values and purposes. To ignore 
accountability, or to dismiss it as a technical problem best left to 
the experts, is to miss one of the most important conversations of 
post-industrial society." (Stein, 2001:139) 
While accountability is not a new concept to health care, it has become 
increasingly prominent in public discourse. For example, Roy Romanow, the 
Commissioner on the Future of Health Care, recommended the five key 
(f^ principles of the Canada Health Act (accessibility, universality, medically 
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necessary, comprehensiveness, and quality) be supplemented by a sixth 
principle, namely, accountability (Commission, 2003). In addition, the 2003 First 
Ministers' Health Accord positioned accountability as a major priority. "First 
Ministers commit to enhancing transparency and accountability for our health 
care system while ensuring health care remains affordable...First Ministers agree 
to establish a Health Council to monitor and make annual public reports on the 
implementation of the Accord, particularly its accountability and transparency 
provisions" (First Ministers, 2003). 
The accountability discourse is also occurring in an environment of annually 
escalating health care costs, rapidly growing hospital deficits and complex 
/s»n changes in the health care system. The restructuring of healthcare in Ontario has 
resulted in some cases in a shift from local, community-based hospitals to more 
complex, integrated and multi-facility organizations. These factors have raised 
concerns about the effectiveness of hospital governance and questions about the 
level of accountability exercised by hospitals. Over the past decade hospitals 
have been subjected to third party reviews, operational reviews, provincially-
appointed supervision. These and other investigations have repeatedly identified 
governance flaws, including the lack of clarity regarding the boards' 
accountabilities to government and communities (Quigley and Scott, 2004). As 
a result a number of amalgamated hospitals and/or hospitals under supervision 
have initiated governance reviews; however, there is only anecdotal evidence 
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/"^ about their governance practices and conceptualization of accountability (Quigiey 
and Scott, 2004). 
Single hospital boards have been the traditional method of governance in 
Canada since the first hospitals were built in the 1600s (Brunelle, Leatt and 
Leggatt, 1998). While other provinces have moved toward health care system 
regionaiization, Ontario's hospitals have maintained governance by independent 
boards of directors. Recently, the Ontario Hospital Association (OHA) has 
expressed concerns that the provincial government is attempting to undermine 
independent hospital governance through two pieces of legislation, specifically 
Bill 18: The Audit Statute Law Amendment Act (2003) and Bill 8: The 
^m\ Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act (2004). Together, the Acts signal the 
government's intention to have the provincial auditor audit hospitals and to 
establish performance agreements with individual hospitals. As noted in the 
OHA's discussion paper on Hospital Governance and Accountability in Ontario: 
"While there is agreement in principle that performance 
agreement and hospital audits by the provincial auditor are 
appropriate, it is important to note that the consolidation of 
hospitals operating results, assets and liabilities in the 
government's financial statement would result in the de facto 
loss of hospital corporate independence as the government 
would be seen to be directly accountable as it is currently 
with ministries." (Quigiey and Scott, 2004:8) 
The OHA is particularly concerned that Bill 8 will permit the government to 
impose (not negotiate) performance contracts and sanction hospital 
( administrators for failure to meet the performance deliverables. If hospital CEOs 
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were directly accountable to the Minister of Health, the oversight responsibilities 
of local hospitals boards could be compromised. Therefore, in order to 
demonstrate that hospitals are serious about improving accountability through 
governance, the OHA identified hospital governance renewal as a key strategic 
priority (OHA, 2004). The four strategies in support of this direction are to: 
1. Identify and advance health care governance best practices. 
2. Develop and promote initiatives that will result in greater joint 
accountability for government and providers, including accountability 
frameworks. 
3. Support initiatives that will result in greater accountability of the 
community-at-large in how they access the health care system and what 
they expect of it. 
4. Continue the development of hospital and system performance reporting. 
A careful reading of these initiatives suggests the OHA tends to view 
accountability as a bilateral relationship between the provincial government and 
hospitals (see #2 above), while also wanting to hold the community accountable 
for proper use of the health care system and for maintaining realistic 
expectations (see #3 above). Although the latter initiative appears to put the 
community in the curious position of having to defend their use of hospital 
services, it does suggest the OHA recognizes some type of an accountability 
relationship with the community is required. The OHA further appears to endorse 
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the need for a community orientation by voicing their opposition to Bill 8 in terms 
of a loss of community accountability because it shuts "communities out of local 
hospital decisions by eliminating the responsibilities of local hospital boards" 
(OHA, 2004). 
The OHA's call for governance renewal to prevent the loss of individual hospital 
autonomy has been premised on the argument that volunteer directors serve as 
a critical link between hospital and communities. This defence raises questions 
about the community accountability exercised by hospitals, given the current 
pressure for boards to focus on oversight responsibilities and accountabilities to 
government. As noted above, the lack of clarity with regard to the board's 
respective accountabilities to government and their communities has been 
frequently cited as problematic (Quigley and Scott, 2004), suggesting there may 
be a variety of different ways in which hospitals, governments and indeed 
citizens think about the concept of accountability. 
Therefore, the approach of this research report is to offer a critical examination of 
the accountability discourse, specifically in the context of Ontario's hospital 
boards. Through the lens of public administration, I hope to take a multifaceted 
view of accountability with a view to understanding how community accountability 
is demonstrated through hospital governance structures and processes in an 
environment of multiple accountabilities. The critical analysis and discussion will 
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be grounded in empirical evidence by examining how community accountability is 
operationalized at six hospitals in Ontario. 
The fundamental research question for analysis and discussion in this paper is: 
What governance practices and structures do Ontario's hospital boards employ 
to demonstrate accountability to the communities they serve? 
In order to answer this question, the next section will review the literature on 
accountability and non-profit hospital governance. The following sections will 
then: 
• describe the methodology for applying the theoretical discussion to 
selected Ontario hospitals; and, 
• report on the findings and their implications. 
Finally, the analysis offered in this report, although focused on the health care 
sector, may also be applicable to the local government milieu. Municipalities 
operate in a complex environment with multiple accountabilities, which includes a 
significant upward accountability to the provincial government. It is my hope that 
the discussion contained in the report sheds light on the accountability 
challenges and opportunities that may exist in a variety of public administration 
settings. 
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II. Theoretical Framework 
A) Accountability in Public Administration 
The traditional way of thinking about accountability in public administration as 
coherently flowing upward through the civil service to elected politicians may be 
insufficient given today's complex public service delivery environment. Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992), who popularized the New Public Management (NPM) 
movement in their book, Reinventing Government, argue that governments 
should set policy priorities (steer) rather than participate in the direct production 
of public goods and services (row). This managerial reform of the public 
0*^ administration model has resulted in non-profits and other non-government 
organizations delivering public services on behalf of the government in order to 
improve efficiency, increase customer choice and satisfaction, and empower 
managers to seek innovative solutions (Kernaghan, Marson and Borins, 2002). 
However, as governments retreat from direct service delivery, the "post-
bureaucratic" model of the state as contractor and regulator presents new 
accountability challenges. 
While the state does not deliver medical care directly in Ontario, their role as 
public service contractor, primary health care funder and hospital regulator offers 
an excellent opportunity to discuss accountability issues within a public 
/#"n administration framework. As noted by Janice Gross Stein in her national 
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/P 
bestseller, The Cult of Efficiency, "accountability to the public by those who 
provide public goods should not be a revolutionary concept" (2001:76). Yet the 
tripartite configuration in health care of the state, hospitals and communities (see 
Figure 1 below), renders accountability as an increasingly complicated, often 
indirect and sometimes unclear concept. Citizens, as taxpayers, patients and 
stakeholders in the health care system, expect direct accountability from those 
providing health services, while health providers hold they are accountable to the 
purchaser (i.e. the state) of their services, and the state remains directly 
accountable to citizens. 
Figure 1: Diagram of Accountability Relationship 
Citizen, Taxpayer 
Consumer/Patient 
Public Service 
Provider 
(Hospital) 
(The State ^\ (Provincial ) 
Government)/ 
The traditional public administration concept of accountability may not 
accommodate the requirements of the "post-bureaucratic state. A 1980s public 
administration study in Britain declared "accountability, answerability or 
responsibility as being directed to the community at large, rather than following 
the lines of constitutional accountability "(Day and Klein, 1987:229). When seen 
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through the historical lens of public administration, the conceptualization of 
accountability has always moved along a continuum. The table below highlights 
the changing characteristics of, and mechanisms to ensure, accountability in 
public administration. 
Table 1. Accountability in Public Administration 
0 
Adapted from McGarvey, 2001 
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The above table demonstrates that rather than being sacrosanct, accountability 
is actually a socially constructed concept that varies over time and context 
(Ebrahim, 2003). 
Today, accountability in public administration seems firmly grounded in the 
regulatory perspective as the new public management model of contracting out, 
coupled with calls for greater accountability, have increased the surveillance, 
audit, and regulatory capacity of government (McGarvey, 2001). While the 
regulatory method has been praised for improving the fiscal accountability and 
efficiency of agencies delivering services on behalf of the government (Mulgan, 
#^ 2001), others have strongly criticized the impact of a contracting regime because 
it positions government as the ultimate body to which service deliverers must 
give account and thereby downplays accountability to citizens and the public 
(Haque, 2001, Shields and Evans, 1998). 
The regulatory model may further disturb the chain of accountability from the 
perspective of the "common citizen" who may simply not be able to determine 
whether government or its contractors are responsible for a particular service 
(Peters 1993 cited in Haque, 2001). As well, the "common citizen" has greater 
interest in the accountability of a public service delivered directly, and is less 
concerned with the accountability tasks of regulation and evaluation that have 
jpn little direct impact on them (Haque, 2001). 
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Finally the regulatory perspective has been criticized for framing the relationship 
as yet another neutral, apolitical way of ensuring accountability (Pollitt, 1986). 
Indeed the language of New Public Management - efficiency, effectiveness and 
"value for money" - arguably detracts from the more fundamental political 
question regarding the allocation of societal resources (Shield and Evans, 1998). 
Stein (2001) argues that efficiency has no inherent value. "Efficiency is about 
how we should allocate our goals, not what our goals should be". (Stein, 2001: 
68). For example, citizens, whether they are patients or taxpayers, are likely to 
want a short (and therefore efficient) hospital stay, but it is also likely they are 
more interested in an improved health status. 
There is a perhaps a cautionary warning about a governance environment that 
creates a confusing or insignificant accountability framework for citizens. In a 
study of public participation modes within the public administration framework, 
Cheryl Simrell King and her colleagues argue: 
"Administrative legitimacy requires active accountability to 
citizens, from whom the ends of government derive. 
Accountability, in turn requires a framework for the 
interpretation of basic values, one that must be developed 
jointly by bureaucrats and citizens in real world situations 
rather than assumed. The legitimate administrative state, in 
other words, is one inhabited by active citizens "(King et al, 
1998:319). 
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Thus no matter how intractable the problem of locating accountability has 
become, if new structures of governance are to retain legitimacy there must be 
some line of accountability to citizens and their communities. 
B) Governance and Accountability 
Interest in governance has greatly increased over the past two decades. Private 
sector corporate failures in Canada and the US, due in part to serious 
mismanagement and flaws in corporate governance have been a driving force 
behind numerous studies documenting problems and methods to improve 
governance in the for-profit sector (Cadbury Report 1992, Dey Report 1994). 
Governance failures in the non-profit sector (Canadian Red Cross, National Arts 
Centre, and the International Olympic Committee) have also received negative 
public attention and the Broadbent Report (1999) highlighted governance issues 
and challenges in the voluntary sector in Canada. Together these reports (a) 
acknowledge that public confidence in private and non-profit institutions has been 
threatened by governance failures and (b) assume that good governance is 
necessary for effective organizational performance and overall accountability 
(Gill, 2001). 
Before continuing this discussion, a definition of non-profits is required in the 
context of this paper. In contemporary society, three broad sectors can be 
defined, namely (1) public/state sector, (2) the private/business/market sector 
and (3) the voluntary/non-profit/third sector (Shields and Evans, 1998). It has 
been argued that hospitals should be considered part of the broader public/state 
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sector because they are so heavily and directly dependent upon government 
funding (Shields and Evans, 1998); however, this position does not recognize 
that hospitals are independently governed. As a result, hospitals are more 
appropriately defined as non-profit organizations because they a) serve the 
broader public interest (i.e. through the delivery of public goods or services), b) 
do not distribute profits to owners/stakeholders, and c) are independently 
governed by volunteer trustees or directors. 
As noted previously, a volunteer board governs each hospital in Ontario and 
there are over 3500 individual board members in the province (Quigley and 
Scott, 2004). Their key responsibilities are to: 
• Define the purposes, principles and objectives of the hospital; 
• Ensure and monitor the quality of hospital services; 
• Ensure the fiscal integrity and long-term future of the hospital; and, 
• Arrange for and monitor the effectiveness of hospital's management 
(Hundert and Crawford, 2002). 
In the 1992 report of the steering committee struck by the Ontario Ministry of 
Health to review the Public Hospitals Act, governance is defined as, "the exercise 
of authority, direction and control over the hospital by its board of directors" 
(Steering Committee, 1992:13). The report also identified a key governance 
challenge, namely the need for a clear definition of hospital accountability to 
patients, the public and government (Steering Committee, 1992). The issue 
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/f^ reflected concerns that board members were acting as community advocates 
without due regard for their performance and financial oversight responsibilities. 
The recommendations in the Steering Committee's report to strengthen hospital 
governance provisions of the Public Hospitals Act remain largely unimplemented 
today (Quigley and Scott, 2004), but serve to highlight that hospital governance, 
like non-profit governance in general, has often been found problematic 
(Cornforth, 2003). Carver succinctly summarizes these concerns as: 
"An extraterrestrial observer of board behaviour could be 
forgiven for concluding that boards exist for several 
questionable reasons. They seem to exist to help the staff, 
to lend their prestige to organizations, to rubber stamp 
management desires, to give boards members an 
opportunity to be unappointed department heads, to be sure 
staffs get the funds they want, to micromanage 
organizations, to protect lower staff from management and 
/0**\ sometimes even to gain some advantage for board members 
( as special customers of their organizations, or to give board 
members a prestigious addition to their resumes." (Carver, 
1997) 
A number of empirical studies about the problems of non-profit governance have 
lent support to managerial hegemony theory (Hung, 1998) which argues that 
boards are powerless and essentially a legal fiction because only the 
professional managerial class has the expertise, time and resources to control 
the organization (Berles and Means, 1932). These studies suggest that board 
power in nonprofits is limited by a) management's control over the selection of 
volunteer directors b) the limited time volunteer directors have to perform their 
duties c) the superior expertise, information and advice available to management 
/#p\ and d) the norms of board behaviour that limit volunteers board members from 
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#^ acting together as critics of management (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1995). 
However, other research has focused attention on various types of contingency 
theories of board-management power relations to consider the situational 
variables, personal characteristics, and other contextual features that both 
constrain and enable non-profit board power (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1995, 
Cornforth 2001, Murray et al 1992: Wood, 1992). 
Despite the problems and challenges of governance, hospital boards "sit atop" 
complex organizations delivering a valued public service, universal health care 
and therefore their impact cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Carver has claimed 
that "boards are at the extreme end of the accountability chain" (Carver, 
jswv 1997:16); however, as we have seen in the New Public Management 
environment, this conceptualization of a non-profit, publicly funded board as 
having ultimate accountability may be incomplete. 
Webster's Dictionary defines accountability as "the state of being accountable, 
subject to the obligation to report, explain or justify something; responsible; 
answerable". In the Canadian non-profit sector, accountability has been defined 
"as the requirement to explain and accept responsibility for carrying out an 
assigned mandate in light of agreed upon expectations" (Broadbent Report, 
1999). Shortt and MacDonald define accountability in Canadian healthcare as: 
"Set within an implicit ethical context, accountability is the 
obligation to answer to an authority that conferred a 
responsibility, by an agent who accepted, with the resources 
-. and delegated authority necessary to achieve it, and with the 
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understanding that inadequate performance will result in 
intervention" (Shortt and MacDonald, 2002) 
These definitions reflect the powerful normative legacy of traditional 
conceptualizations of accountability as flowing upward to an authority. However, 
in relation to nonprofits, other definitions have explored a broader perspective to 
suggest that accountability is about being "held responsible" by others and about 
"taking responsibility" for oneself (Ebrahim, 2003). Accountability in this regard 
has two dimensions. First, it is external in nature and achieved through a reactive 
response to overseers. Second, accountability is internal, motivated by "felt 
responsibility" (Fry, 1995) and achieved through a proactive effort to ensure the 
public trust and organizational mission is achieved. In other words, 
accountability may be defined as the means through which individuals and 
organizations are held externally to account for their actions and as a means by 
which they take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and scrutinizing 
organizational mission, goals and performance (Ebrahim, 2003). 
C) Hospital Boards as Stewards OR Agents of the State? 
Stewardship has been defined as "the willingness to be accountable for the well-
being of the larger organization by operating in service, rather than in control, of 
those around us. Simply stated, it is accountability without control or compliance. 
Stewardship maintains accountability for keeping things under control but does 
not centralize the power or point of action" (Block, 1993). Indeed, non-profit 
governance has historically embraced the stewardship values of philanthropy, 
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voluntarism, and independence to advocate for services to meet client needs and 
to secure resources necessary to enhance the appropriate quantity and quality of 
those services (Alexander and Wiener, 1998). 
However, this stewardship approach focuses board work on maintaining assets 
rather than monitoring the performance of management and ensuring financial 
accountability to stakeholders. As non-profits shift from organizations "doing 
good" to professional agencies delivering public services on behalf of 
government they have been increasingly required to justify their spending and 
management activities (Fitz Randolph, 1998). 
"The public is expressing concern that nonprofits, similar to 
government and market institutions need to justify not only 
/F^ what services they deliver but also how they operate. 
' Citizens are demonstrating that focus on organizational 
mission is no longer sufficient and that organizations must 
demonstrate outcomes and efficiency. Mission based value 
is waning and nonprofits must prove their economic value 
through demonstration of programmatic and fiscal 
accountability." (Christensen, 2002: 9). 
Thus non-profits may face pressure to balance the stewardship model with a 
more corporate governance approach. Indeed, hospital trustees/directors in 
Ontario have often assumed the role of community advocates to pursue more 
resources but in doing so have faced govemment displeasure as politicians and 
bureaucrats attempt to contain the financial demands of hospitals (Quigley and 
Scott, 2004). This strained relationship caused by fiscal challenges, and coupled 
with the trend toward private sector emulation in public administration, has 
* resulted in arguments that the survival of non-profits depends on their becoming 
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more businesslike in form, structure, practices and philosophy (Fine 1990, 
Steckel et al 1987). Private sector corporate governance stresses the role of the 
board in strategy and policy development, risk management, competitive 
positioning and monitoring management. The table below highlights the 
significant differences between the two governance models. 
Table 2: Differentiating Characteristics of Non-profit and Corporate 
Governance Models 
Source: Alexander and Weiner, 1998 
The literature review yielded very little empirical evidence about the performance 
of nonprofits that adopt corporate governance models. There are some 
anecdotal reports, case studies, prescriptive articles, and commentaries 
advocating either for or against governance changes (Busch 1992, Cnaan 1996, 
Conger 2004, Eisenberg 1992); however, because arguments are largely value-
based, it is difficult to assess the challenges and opportunities non-profits are 
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quo. 
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facing when attempting to affect governance changes or maintain their status 
One study entitled Adoption of the Corporate Governance Model by Nonprofit 
Organizations looked at nineteen hundred nonprofit hospitals in the USA. The 
authors, Alexander and Weiner (1998) found the for-profit governance model is 
neither feasible nor even a desirable solution to problems facing many nonprofit 
organizations. "Some non-profits may not find the corporate governance model 
appropriate because the priorities and design principles it endorses run counter 
to the institutions' missions, values and relationships with key stakeholders" 
(Alexander and Weiner, 1998:239). In other words, the corporate model may be 
appealing but difficult to adopt because there are strong pressures from internal 
and external forces to adhere to traditional values of voluntarism, constituent 
representation and stewardship. Alexander and Weiner also found that the 
corporate and philanthropic models of governance are "ideal types" because 
most hospitals exhibited hybrid combinations of the two models. The authors of 
the study did not offer an empirical explanation for this finding but suggested that 
hospitals may be attempting to strike a balance between competing 
accountability demands (Alexander and Weiner, 1998). 
At the same time the non-profit sector is adopting the corporate model as part of 
a larger trend to emulate business; corporate governance in the private sector is 
also under-going reform in the wake of business scandals. The best practices, 
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voluntary guidelines and legal requirements in the private sector (Cadbury 1992, 
Dey 1994) are largely based on the principal-agent theory. Principal - agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), offers a normative approach for ensuring 
governance accountability by limiting managerial power. The theory assumes a) 
the goals of the principal (owner) and agent (manager) are in conflict; b) agents 
are motivated by external forces and c) the principal has the power to control the 
agent's behaviour by establishing incentives to ensure the agent contributes 
maximally to the principal's objectives. Under this paradigm hospitals and other 
nonprofits that are funded by the state may be described as agents of the state. 
Therefore, the state (principal) has the right to require an account from hospitals 
(agents) and also a right to impose sanctions if the account or actions are 
inadequate. 
However the principal-agent framework has a series of limitations concerning 
accountability in nonprofits (Ebrahim, 2003). First, given that the goals of the 
principal and agent are assumed to be incongruent, the principal must control the 
agent's behaviour by (a) linking agent compensation to performance objectives 
and (b) monitoring activities of the agents. As a result, non-profits are required 
to spend more resources negotiating with government and monitoring and 
reporting on their performance. These administrative responsibilities may also 
require organizations to adopt private sector managerial priorities and in turn 
dismiss the democratic structures of community accountability (for example, 
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open board meetings, community consultations) as too costly and time 
consuming (Shields and Evans, 1998). 
Second, a focus on external accountability measures may lead to the neglect of 
issues of accountability that are internal to the organization such as integrity and 
achieving mission. According to Fry, the central concern is "whether 
accountability is experienced as a monitoring or as an enabling process" (Fry, 
1995:186). The emphasis on meeting the external oversight requirements may 
also force organizations away from advocacy and towards a subordinate status 
as a service provider, which ultimately lessens their influence over public policy. 
Third, principal-agent theory tends to focus on the behavioural requirements of 
agents while deemphasizing those of the principals. For example, the principal 
may require the agent to develop a multi-year business plan, yet only provide an 
annual funding commitment. Finally, principal-agent theory fails to recognize that 
non-profits are accountable to many stakeholders. The interests of multiple 
principals may coincide but they are more likely to be in competition. While 
businesses are accountable primarily to shareholders or their owners, non-profit 
organizations operate in a much more complicated environment where there may 
be no clarity of paramount duty. Certain non-profits such as trade associations 
or professional societies are clearly owned by their members. However, the 
community as a whole is often considered as having legitimate ownership of 
social institutions such as hospitals and schools. While not possessing the legal 
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status of a shareholder, this definition implies the moral equivalent of ownership 
(Carver and Carver, 1996). 
D) Stakeholder Theory 
The concept of moral ownership can be explored through the lens of stakeholder 
theory (Freeman, 1984), which argues that corporations have accountability to a 
broad range of stakeholders. Like other theories of the firm, stakeholder theory 
was developed to address accountability issues in the context of for-profit firms. 
However, as noted by Drucker (1992), one of the most significant differences 
between the two types of organizations is that non-profits have more 
stakeholders. Freeman defines stakeholders as "any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives 
(1984:46). Savage et al (1997:7) add, "stakeholders are those individuals, 
groups or organizations who have a contractual, ethical, financial and/or political 
interest (stake) in the decisions and actions of a particular organization. 
Stakeholders attempt to affect those actions in order to influence the direction of 
the organization so that it is consistent with meeting the needs and priorities 
(stakes) of the stakeholders". By this definition, it is not possible for an 
organization to select its stakeholders since only the stakeholder decides 
whether to have a particular stake in the organization. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that there are two possible perspectives 
why organizations should be responsive to their stakeholders. From a normative 
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or business ethics perspective, it is intrinsically desirable for companies to 
behave in a socially responsible way to satisfy their stakeholders. The social 
science or instrumental stakeholder approach argues it is good business for 
organizations to be responsive to stakeholders. Essentially, trustworthy and 
cooperative behaviour will lead to superior results than opportunistic and selfish 
behaviour. 
The moral or ethics argument has been vilified by proponents of shareholder-
based agency theory, who argue that the only moral obligation facing managers 
is to maximize shareholder return, which will ultimately (through the 'efficient' 
market) result in the best allocation of social resources (Jensen, 1991, Drucker 
1982). However, in their best selling book, The Naked Corporation, authors Don 
Tapscott and David Ticoll argue that consideration of stakeholders' interest in 
combination with honesty, accountability and transparency is the foundation of 
competitive advantage for firms. The business case approach to stakeholder 
theory is supported by empirical research that suggests positive stakeholder 
relations can contribute to improved financial performance (Agle et al, 1999, 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). The culmination of empirical evidence has led to 
a suggestion that ultimately there is little inconsistency between the objective of 
agency theory (increased shareholder value) and the practice of a stakeholder 
approach in the private sector. 
"We consider that it is only by taking account of stakeholder 
as well as shareholder interests that companies can achieve 
jspn long-term profit maximization, and ultimately, shareholder 
\ wealth maximization. This belief is principally based on a 
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growing body of literature and empirical evidence that 
suggest that corporate accountability which takes into 
account a broad range of social, ethical and environmental 
factors is conducive to financial performance". (Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004:29) 
The literature review yielded very little evidence of the application of stakeholder 
theory to nonprofits and Donald and Preston (1995) doubt the value of doing so 
because private sector firms are governed by different principles for different 
ends. However, Scholl argues that the normative and instrumental 
considerations can be equally applied to public sector stakeholder scenarios 
because "the shift from more hierarchical to more network-type of organizations 
further demands inclusion and management of constituencies" (Scholl, 2000). 
Nevertheless, there are cautions to consider when applying stakeholder theory to 
the public sector and non-profits because most stakeholders cannot formally hold 
organizations accountable (Fry, 1995), and stakeholders vary in their relative 
influence and power (Savage et al, 1997). As a result, board members may feel 
more responsive (or accountable) to the more formal, urgent and powerful 
stakeholder. Thus, how boards define, reconcile and manage their multiple 
accountability obligations becomes a fundamental question. 
The competing theories of stewardship, principal-agent and stakeholder offer 
different perspectives on how boards can manage or respond to their 
accountability pressures. However, Morgan (1989) has argued these many 
theories and ways of thinking about organizations do not match the complexity 
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and sophistication of the organizational realities of today. To address this 
weakness, Morgan argues that a multi-paradigm approach must be taken to 
"confront and manage contradiction and paradox, rather then pretend they do not 
exist". This has led to calls for a new conceptual framework to integrate different 
perspectives (Hung, 1998) and it has been argued that a paradox perspective 
can provide a new and powerful way of looking at non-profit governance 
(Cornforth, 2003). In the case of hospital boards, the paradox framework 
highlights the ambiguities and tensions at play as boards: 
• Desire to take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and 
scrutinizing the mission, goals and performance of the organization 
(stewardship); 
• Respond to powerful external demands to account for their actions 
(principal-agent); and, 
• Attempt to assess and manage the demands of a host of other competing 
interests, including those of the community served (stakeholder). 
E) Summary 
As governments develop more networks and partnerships to deliver public 
services, the dominant public administration accountability mechanisms have 
become audits, surveillance, reporting and other managerial and regulatory 
procedures (McGarvey, 2001). While the market discipline approach and its 
corresponding emphasis on outputs and performance can result in greater 
efficiency, there may also be negative impacts on the ability of publicly funded 
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/^ non-profit organizations to meet multiple accountability demands. Hospital 
boards have historically advocated on behalf of their communities by serving as 
stewards. In recent years, fiscal challenges have led to calls for improved 
governance by increasing the board's oversight responsibilities. However, the 
New Public Management environment has also increased boards' accountability 
to government through increased performance reporting and regulation. As a 
result, hospital boards may be functioning as both principals of their organization 
and agents of the state. The tensions and challenges created by multiple 
accountabilities, including the relative power of their stakeholders, may also 
impact boards' accountability to the communities they serve. 
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III. Research and Results 
Having established a theoretical framework, the next section will describe the 
research process and report on the findings regarding the demonstration of 
community accountability by hospital boards. 
A) Purpose 
Historically hospitals have relied on the governing boards as the principal mode 
of exercising community accountability. The traditional role of the board member 
has been to reflect the community they serve and help form the public 
conscience of the healthcare organization, while also bringing a unique 
perspective to the board (Savage et al, 1997). 
"Hospital boards represent an interface between the hospital 
and its environment insofar as members are drawn from, 
and have a primary affiliation with, organizations and 
agencies outside the hospital. This dual alliance with the 
organization and the outside locality not only permits direct 
exchanges of information and resources across boundaries 
but also serves as a mechanism for holding hospitals 
accountable to serving the needs of their communities." 
(Alexander, Weiner and Sued, 2000) 
During the 1990s many Ontario hospitals responded to concerns about the 
quality of their governance by reviewing the roles and responsibilities of their 
boards. According to Quigiey and Scott (2004), the Carver Policy Governance 
Model has been the most widely used approach by the Ontario hospital sector. 
The starting point for the Carver model is board accountability for the 
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organization it governs and the constituents it serves. The concept of moral 
ownership is a significant factor that contributes to a sense of felt responsibility 
and board members are encouraged to understand the principle that they have 
authority and accountability to serve the interests of the organization's mission, 
clientele and constituents (Carver and Carver, 1996). 
However, as boards have become increasingly concerned with their oversight 
responsibilities and accountabilities to government, the Pointer and Orlikoff 
model (1999) has become more attractive (Quigley and Scott, 2004). Their 
model suggests that healthcare boards have five central roles: (1) defining 
organizational ends, (2) ensuring management performance; (3) overseeing 
financial performance; (4) overseeing the quality of patient care; and (5) 
providing for the board's own structure, composition and effectiveness. Boards 
carry out these roles in three ways: (1) by making policies, (2) by making 
decisions, and (3) by overseeing performance. Pointer and Orlikoff also argue 
that in order to meet their obligations boards must: 
• Identify and prioritize key stakeholders and understand their interests and 
expectations; and, 
• Represent stakeholders and ensure that the organization's resources and 
capacities are deployed in ways that benefit them (Pointer and Orlikoff, 
2002). 
Thus Pointer and Orlikoff, with their list of over seventy principles, offer a 
prescriptive model of healthcare governance that draws on both principal-agent 
MPA Research Report 
Cathy Cuylle 
32 
and stakeholder theories to improve governance. Although the focus of this study 
is not to determine the effectiveness of the Pointer and Orlikoff model, its growing 
popularity does suggest that hospital boards are seeking new tools and 
strategies to manage multiple accountabilities in a complex environment. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research report is to collect information about 
hospital governance in Ontario in order to identify the governance practices and 
structures currently employed by hospital boards to achieve community 
accountability. 
B) Methodology 
In order to conduct the research I used a multiple case study methodology. 
While case studies, as a research tool have been subjected to criticism, Yin 
(1994) and Stake (1995) have argued that they are a reliable methodology when 
executed with care. The methodology for this research project drew on Yin and 
Stakes design protocols to enhance reliability and validity. In particular, a short 
survey was emailed to staff members that provide support to their boards (see 
Appendix A for the survey instrument). The purpose of the survey was to gather 
descriptive information about current governance practices. The survey was 
followed by telephone calls to confirm data and provide an opportunity to ask 
supplementary questions. Conversations were documented. Additional 
information and evidence was gathered through reference material such as 
board by-laws and policies, board reference manuals, organizational websites, 
and reports. The rationale for using multiple sources of data is triangulation of 
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evidence, which increases the reliability of the data by limiting threats to both 
construct and internal validity. 
The hospitals chosen as case studies represent large acute care academic 
teaching hospitals in Ontario. The hospitals are: 
• London Health Sciences Centre (LHSC) 
• Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation (HHS) 
• The Ottawa Hospital 
Two hospitals in Toronto were also selected: 
• University Health Network (UHN) 
• Sunnybrook and Women's College Health Sciences Centre (S&W). 
In addition to providing resource-intensive patient care, these five organizations 
also function as teaching and research institutions in affiliation with their 
university partners. 
As a further point of comparison a relatively smaller community teaching hospital, 
Toronto East General Hospital (TEGH) was included in the survey group. It is 
recognized that the small sample size limits the generalizability of the results; 
however, the focus of the paper is to develop an introductory understanding of 
community accountability at some of Ontario's leading hospitals. 
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C) Research Model 
As defined earlier in this paper, accountability is a broad concept that implies a 
relationship of monitoring, control and answerability to superiors or public 
constituents (Fry, 1995). Community accountability applies these relationships 
"to the interests and needs of all individuals residing within a reasonably 
circumscribed geographic area in which there is a sense of interdependence and 
belonging" (Alexander, 2000). Accountability may also refer to the means by 
which individuals and organizations take internal responsibility for continuously 
shaping and scrutinizing organizational mission, goals and performance 
(Ebrahim, 2003), with the intention to improve accountability to the community 
(Alexander, 2000). 
The literature on hospital governance suggests boards can demonstrate 
accountability to whom and how in a variety of ways and this paper will explore 
four dimensions of community accountability: 
1) accountability statements; 
2) corporate membership; 
3) community information gathering; and, 
4) decision-making transparency. 
Below is a visual conceptualization of the research model employed to assess 
and evaluate hospital board practices and structures as demonstrations of 
community accountability. 
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Figure 2. Measures of Community Accountability 
Accountability 
Statements 
Corporate 
Membership 
Community 
Accountability 
Community Info 
Gathering 
Decision-making 
Transparency 
The four dimensions were selected because they can be readily measured and 
were often cited in the literature review. The first two dimensions seek to explore 
the question of accountability to whom, while the latter dimensions focus on how 
accountability to the community is demonstrated. 
It is recognized that these dimensions do not address the fundamental issue of 
accountability for what? Some have argued that it may be difficult and even 
inappropriate to hold single hospitals accountable for anything other than the 
quality and cost of the care it provides (Brunelle, Leatt and Leggat, 1998). 
Alternatively, it could be expected that healthcare organizations must be 
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^ accountable to the citizens of their community for the health status of the 
population. "Accountability for what" is a crucial social question in today's 
complex health care environment; however, it is beyond the scope of this paper 
and as such the measures employed will address accountability to whom and 
how. 
D) Results 
In order to provide context and report on the findings, the following section will 
explain each dimension of community accountability and summarize the results 
of the primary research. 
/#»N 1. Accountability Statements 
In a recent survey of hospital board chairs in Canada, Brunelle, Leatt and Leggat 
(1998) found that boards revealed ambivalence about to whom they are 
accountable and did not demonstrate a high level of accountability to the 
community. In response to the question, "To whom do you feel your board has 
the greatest accountability?" only 43% of the board chair respondents felt most 
accountable to the local citizens. Hospital boards were also criticized for failing 
to define in their mission statement precisely to whom they are accountable, 
stating "Shouldn't all boards define in their Mission Statements precisely to whom 
they are accountable and for what?" (Brunelle et al, 1998). While the mission 
statements can provide a very public articulation of the board's message to the 
^ms community about accountability expectations, the Administrative By-laws 
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governing each board offer additional context and background. By identifying to 
whom accountability is defined in both mission statements and board by-laws the 
intention of community accountability (Hancock, 1992) or articulation of felt 
responsibility (Fry, 1995) by the board can be assessed. 
A key word search was employed to assess to whom accountability is defined in 
mission statement and by-laws. The selected words and appropriate synonyms 
are identified in the chart below: 
Table 3: Key Word Search 
In order for hospital boards to articulate accountability to the community, one of 
the key words or synonyms in the first three rows should be combined (by the 
word "to") with a word from the fourth row. 
All six hospitals post mission statements to their websites and the analysis for 
this paper was conducted using the versions that appeared on the respective 
websites as of June 2004. Hamilton Health Sciences (HHS) and Sunnybrook 
and Women's College Health Sciences Centre (S&W) are the only hospitals to 
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f^ use the words "accountable" or "accountability" in their mission statement, while 
just S&W identifies to whom it is accountable by stating "We are accountable to 
our communities for the human and fiscal resources entrusted to us". HHS lists 
accountability as a key value but does not define to whom, rather stating 
"Accountability: We will create value and accept responsibility for our actions". 
London Health Sciences Centre (LHSC), University Health Network (UHN), 
Toronto East General Hospital (TEGH) and The Ottawa Hospital (TOH) have 
mission statements that do not contain the words "accountable" or 
"accountability". However, LHSC and TEGH use the word "commitment" in their 
mission statements. TEGH is "committed to delivering quality, compassionate 
/P»v patient care and to working in collaboration to improve the quality ofiife of our 
diverse community". LHSC is the only hospital of the six to position its mission 
statement as a series of commitments to eight stakeholder groups, including: 
• patients and families; 
• physicians, employees and volunteers; 
• researchers; 
• students and trainees, 
• health care partners; 
• funders (government and donors); 
• the people of London and Middlesex; and, 
• the people of Southwestern Ontario and beyond. 
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The use of the word "community" in the mission statements greatly varies. UHN 
notes that it has been "providing care to the community for more than 200 years", 
while TEGH states that its mission is "to improve the quality of life of our diverse 
communit/. The Ottawa Hospital's mission is in part to play "an active role in 
promoting and improving health within our community". 
The mentions of the key words in the board by-laws further reflects the inherent 
tensions of hospital governance and the struggle to define accountability in an 
environment of many stakeholders. Consider the following statements taken 
from the board by-laws 
• "The Board serves the community in carrying out its responsibilities... and 
shall be sensitive to the needs of the communities served." (The Ottawa 
Hospital) 
• "The Board is accountable to the patients, the Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care, the Foundation and its donors." (TEGH). 
• Asa Member of the Board, which Is ultimately accountable to the Ministry 
of Health and Long-term Care, a Director shall...act honestly and in good 
faith.." (LHSC) 
• The board... shall act at all times in the best interests of the Corporation, 
while having regard for the needs of the community served."(HHS) 
The examples show a range of accountability statements from specific 
categorization of stakeholders (TEGH) and declarations of ultimate accountability 
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(LHSC) to more broadly defined statements regarding service to the community 
(HHS and the Ottawa Hospital). 
2. Corporate Membership 
Some authors have stressed the importance of board structure and composition, 
arguing that hospitals have greater community accountability when their boards 
comprise a mix of experts and community representatives (Griffith, 1987; Hast 
1989, Arkus, 1993; Gamm 1996). However, others (Hadelman and Orlikoff, 
1999) have challenged the notion that board composition must reflect the 
community, suggesting this approach hinders efforts to create well-performing 
boards with the right mix of skills and expertise. Indeed there has been some 
limited advocacy for paid trustees to ensure a "professional governing board" to 
steer hospitals through the complex clinical, financial, marketplace and strategic 
environments of modern healthcare (Hadelman and Orlikoff, 1999). 
Nevertheless, consumer and/or citizen involvement in healthcare has been 
encouraged by governments to make the healthcare system more accountable to 
the communities they serve (Charles and DeMaio, 1993). Therefore, hospital 
corporate membership may provide an alternative means to assess a board's 
community accountability. The majority of public hospitals in Ontario are 
corporate entities and it can be argued, based on the principal-agent paradigm, 
the hospital board's ultimate accountability is to the organization's members. 
Thus how membership to the hospital's corporation is defined could demonstrate 
MPA Research Report 
Cathy Cuylle 
41 
the board's most direct accountability relationship. Quigley and Scott identify 
four predominant corporate membership models used in Ontario's hospitals 
(Quigley and Scott, 2004). 
I. The Board Membership (Closed) Model: The Board of Directors reserves 
to itself the membership by designating the board members as the sole 
members of the corporation. 
II. Electoral College/Closed Constituency Membership: The Board of 
Directors approves different grouping of stakeholders and invites them to 
elect a certain number of members out of a designated total number of 
members for the corporation. The members, once elected become the 
membership of the corporation for a fixed term. 
III. Membership by Application: The Board of Directors must approve the 
applications before the applicant becomes a member. With this model the 
membership criteria and approval process can help to ensure members 
support the objectives of the hospital. 
IV. Open Membership Model: Anyone can be a member (usually an annual 
token fee is required). This model is often criticized because it cannot 
preclude the potential for inappropriate members or discourage special 
interests from hijacking the board (Quigley and Scott, 2004). 
The model chosen by a particular hospital may be considered to reflect the 
board's commitment (or felt responsibility) to community involvement and 
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engagement as a method for achieving community accountability because as 
corporate entities hospitals boards could position their ultimate accountability 
relationship to the organization's ownership, which is arguably the corporate 
membership. 
However, the research found that some boards do not have the authority to 
define their corporate membership. The respective Acts under which the 
amalgamated hospitals were created dictates both University Health Network 
and Sunnybrook and Women's College Health Sciences corporate membership 
models. The results of the research are summarized below. 
Table 4. Summary of Corporate Membership Models 
Despite the fact that the government has discouraged closed membership 
(Quigley and Scott, 2004), two of the six hospitals employ this model. That none 
of the six hospitals are using the stakeholder model (electoral college/closed 
constituency) suggests further research may be required. Are hospital boards 
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^ familiar with the model and/or is it too complex to implement and maintain? Is 
significant internal or felt responsibility to community involvement in decision-
making a prerequisite for adopting this model? 
3. Community Information Gathering 
Hospital boards also demonstrate community accountability through the 
monitoring and collecting of information about the community from the 
community (Proneca, 1998). Yet as hospital governing boards move away from 
a community, or philanthropic, model to adopt a more corporate governance 
model, they may also potentially give up a primary source of community 
information. This is because health care organizations using a corporate 
jpn governance model tend to select "expert" board members with health care 
industry backgrounds or experience in strategic planning and other complex 
business knowledge, skills and abilities (Axelrod et al, 1994). 
In order to compensate for the loss of "community voice" on the board, research 
has found the establishment of an advisory committee to the larger board or 
community task force to be essential in keeping the board informed on issues of 
importance to various external stakeholders (Savage et al, 1997). The survey 
revealed a variety of board committee approaches, which are described in the 
chart below: 
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Table 5. Community Information Gathering Models 
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In addition, although Sunnybrook and Women's College Health Sciences Centre 
does not have a committee per se they did provide a copy of their Board 
Reference Manual in order to share information about how their board views 
community information gathering in the context of accountability. In particular, 
S&W promotes "Accountability for Reasonableness" as the ethical framework 
for describing the conditions of a fair decision-making process. Adopted from 
Daniels and Sabin book, Setting Limits Fairly: Can We Learn to Share Medical 
Resources'? (2002), the model stresses the importance of a consultative 
approach to decision-making to ensure stakeholders know and understand why 
decisions are being made and how they can participate in the decision-making 
process. The goal is to make reasonable decisions that are inclusive and 
transparent. 
4. Decision-making Participation and Transparency 
Finally, according to the Broadbent Report (1999) a crucial task for accountable 
and effective non-profit boards involves "being transparent, including 
communicating to members, stakeholders and the public and making information 
available." In both the private and public sector, a clear policy direction of 
governance reforms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Saucier Report, Cadbury Report) is 
that transparency regarding financial, operational and governance matters 
enhances accountability. In order to measure decision-making transparency, 
the research focused on board meetings as the setting in which decisions are 
made. 
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Since 1998 the OHA has had a policy of open board meetings to encourage 
hospitals to enhance transparency and links with external and internal 
stakeholders; however, the OHA may also be revisiting the policy because open 
meetings "contribute to and reinforce the misconception (by both board members 
and the public) that the hospital board is accountable only to the community and 
undermine the board's focus on its fiduciary obligations and accountability to the 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care" (Quigley and Scott, 2004). Open 
meetings have also been criticized as ineffective because of a lack of attendance 
by media and public and a reluctance of board members to engage in full 
discussion when media do attend. 
Despite the ineffectiveness argument, open board meetings may actually serve a 
valuable accountability function. Open meetings provide an opportunity for 
citizens to "convey information to officials, influence public opinion, attract media 
attention, set future agendas, delay decisions and communicate with other 
citizens" (Adams, 2004). Perhaps most importantly they provide a measure of 
legitimacy to the decision-making process undertaken by the boards because 
citizens are increasingly cynical about traditional institutions of society (Gill, 
2001). In short, open meetings may benefit the community more than the board 
(Adams, 2004) but they also serve as a powerful, if not intuitive, measure of 
accountability to the community. 
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In order to assess the board's meeting activities vis-a-vis the community, a 
number of questions were asked concerning the transparency of the board's 
discussion and decision-making process, particularly concerning open meetings, 
notification of meetings and ensuring agendas and minutes are publicly available. 
Meetings: 
Board meetings are by and large are open to the public, although private and "in-
camera" sessions are also conducted. Only TEGH and LHSC have private, 
invitation-only board meetings as per their by-laws. It should be noted that an 
open meeting does not mean that members of the public can participate; it simply 
means they may view the board proceedings in person. Survey participants 
were not asked to comment on the attendance levels of internal or external 
stakeholders at board meetings. 
Notification: 
Most hospitals post notifices of board meeting times, locations and sometimes 
agendas on their external and internal websites. In addition, Ottawa Hospital 
places an advertisement in the local paper, while S&W places a notice in their 
staff newsletter. TEGH and LHSC do not provide public notifice of meetings. 
Availability of Reports and Minutes: 
AW surveyed hospitals, except LHSC and TEGH, ensure that their board-
approved minutes are available to the public. UHN and Ottawa post minutes to 
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their internal and external websites. The board minutes from S&W and Hamilton 
Health Sciences are available upon request. The Chair of the TEGH Board 
provides a written summary report that is posted on the internal website only. 
Table 6. Decision-Making Participation and Transparency 
E) Summary 
The four dimensions of community accountability described above may reflect 
the internal or "felt responsibility" proposed by Fry (1995) to ensure adherence to 
mission and an attempt to manage the competing and complex demands of 
multiple stakeholders. While not necessarily as formal as the audit and reporting 
mechanisms used to demonstrate accountability to higher authorities for the 
fulfillment of performance goals and financial integrity, the dimensions offer a 
a description of community accountability: 
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• to whom (through accountability statements and membership models); 
and, 
• how (through information gathering and decision-making participation) 
community accountability. 
The findings show that there are a variety of approaches to, and levels of, 
demonstrable accountability to the community by hospital boards. Similar to 
previous research findings (Brunelle et al, 1999), the mission statements are not 
typically used to outline to whom accountability is defined. The exceptions in the 
research were Sunnybrook and Women's Health Science Centre and the London 
Health Sciences Centre. LHSC's mission statement, which clearly articulates 
/#*v commitments to major stakeholder groups including the people of London and 
Middlesex, is the only one to position the hospital within a complex environment 
and to acknowledge many partners, stakeholders and competing demands. 
The boards' by-laws provide the greatest range of accountability to whom 
statements. Sunnybrook and Women's Health Sciences Centre and University 
Health Network have no statements of accountability in the by-laws. Hamilton 
Health Sciences and The Ottawa Hospital including statements about the 
community; while London Health Sciences Centre and Toronto East General 
Hospital did not. The variety of accountability statements in the by-laws reveal 
the tensions facing all boards in fulfilling multiple roles as resource stewards, 
^ principals of the organization, community advocates, and agents of the state. 
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The corporate membership models were also considered as a dimension for 
assessing to whom hospital boards' define their accountability relationship. On a 
relative scale, Hamilton Health Sciences and The Ottawa Hospital have a more 
open process for joining the hospital corporation through the application model 
and therefore would appear to more inclusive of the broader community in their 
accountability outlook. On the other hand, by limiting membership to the 
corporation to board members only, London Health Sciences Centre and Toronto 
East General Hospital appear less inclusive in this dimension of community 
accountability. In addition, the two hospitals (S&W UHN) with legislated 
corporate membership models do not have the ability to demonstrate in this 
particular dimension to whom they define the accountability relationship. 
Finally, community information gathering at the board level and the transparency 
of decision-making were used as measures of how accountability to the 
community is demonstrated. Only two of the surveyed hospitals (HHS and the 
Ottawa Hospital) have a board committee that includes community members. 
Other hospitals have a less defined board role in this dimension. For example, 
UHN has site-specific community committees that act in an advisory capacity to 
management. 
On the other hand, the demonstration of community accountability through 
decision-making transparency and participation was much stronger. All hospitals, 
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with the exceptions of LHSC and TEGH have open board meetings, provide 
notice of board meetings and will share board minutes and agendas. 
To facilitate comparing the accountability dimensions between the hospitals the 
results of the research findings are summarized below: 
Table 7: Summary of Research Findings 
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| IV. Conclusion 
Hospital boards are often viewed as a link between the organization and its 
larger community. Cornforth (2003) has noted that non-profit boards face a 
number of tensions and paradoxes. Specifically boards struggle with: 
• The tension between board members acting as representatives for 
particular stakeholder groups and as "experts" charged with driving 
organizational performance. 
• The tension between the board roles of driving organizational performance 
versus ensuring conformance (behaving in an accountable and prudent 
manner). 
• The tension between the contrasting board roles of controlling and 
supporting management. 
• The tensions that stem from accountabilities to multiple stakeholders. 
This paper has assumed that hospital boards in Ontario ought to be directly 
accountable to the communities they serve because: 
• they spend public money; 
• make claims of community responsiveness; and, 
• have objectives that have implications for the community as a whole. 
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^ In this context, the primary research question was to determine the governance 
practices and structures employed by a sample of Ontario hospital boards to 
demonstrate accountability to their communities. 
In order to explore the research question through the lens of public 
administration, the various conceptualizations of accountability were first 
consider. As a result of the New Public Management movement and private 
sector emulation, non-profit boards in general have been adopting corporate 
sector governance models to demonstrate efficiency and fiscal accountability for 
resources. Audit, regulation and other surveillance and reporting mechanisms 
have become the dominant way to demonstrate accountability in an environment 
/#*\ where the state sets policy and third parties deliver public goods and services. 
The introduction of Bills 8 and 18 by the Ontario government lends support to 
the notion of accountability as best achieved through a contractual and/or audit 
framework. 
Accountability in the context of non-profit governance was also considered by 
reviewing the organizational governance theories of stewardship, principal-agent 
and stakeholder. The complex environment of non-profit governance may 
require boards to explore a variety of theoretical foundations to create hybrid 
governance models. Ranging from a traditional philanthropic model to a more 
business-like corporate governance model, non-profit boards are looking for 
solutions to assist them as they: 
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• Ensure adequate resources to achieve the organization's mission 
(stewardship); 
• Respond to powerful external demands to account for their actions 
(agent); 
• Oversee the performance of management (principal), and; 
• Attempt to assess and manage the demands of a host of other competing 
interests, including those of the community served (stakeholder). 
In the environment of multiple accountabilities, the Pointer and Orlikoff model of 
health care governance has grown in popularity (Quigley and Scott, 2004). Their 
model combines principal-agent and stakeholder theories to achieve effective 
governance. Indeed the stewardship model seems to be less relevant to non 
profit governance in an environment of aggressive provincial oversight and 
severe fiscal restraint. 
Clearly, hospital boards (as agents) are being held to tighter and more stringent 
accountability requirements by the governments (acting as principals). Yet 
despite the powerful influence of government with its financial and regulatory 
leverage, the research shows most of the surveyed hospitals demonstrate 
accountability to other stakeholders, specifically the community in which they 
were established to serve. 
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In terms of the research approach, accountability to the community was 
assessed through four dimensions. All six hospital boards articulated 
accountability to the community in one of two sources of accountability 
statements (i.e. mission statements or board by-laws). The use of corporate 
membership models as a dimension to articulate accountability to the community 
was not as strong as the accountability statements. 
In the dimensions to assess how community accountability is achieved, some 
hospital boards clearly demonstrate a much stronger community orientation then 
others, based on the results. LHSC and TEGH are perhaps the least 
demonstrative of community accountability based on the dimensions utilized in 
/sf>v the scope of this research. However, most hospital boards still appear to value 
accountability to the community and strive to maintain governance process and 
practices that benefit both the organization and their communities. 
In closing this study has provided evidence of how six of Ontario's leading 
hospitals express community accountability. These findings give rise to an 
obvious question: Are the differences in how (or how much) hospitals 
demonstrate community accountability associated with the specific governance 
model employed by the hospital? For example, does a corporate governance 
model compromise the level of demonstrated community accountability? 
Further research is required to answer such questions. 
/ 
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Finally, policy makers and community members often seek ways to influence 
large social institutions such as hospitals. In Ontario, hospital boards have 
defended independent volunteer governance as the key to community 
responsiveness and accountability. Through an exploration of accountability 
concepts and governance models, this paper has provided an introductory 
understanding how accountability to the community is actually demonstrated and 
achieved at some of Ontario's leading hospitals. 
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Appendix A: 
Survey Questions 
General Governance Questions 
1. What do you call your governing body (Board of Directors, trustees, 
governors, etc) 
2. How many members does your board have? 
3. How many directors are elected and how many ex-officio? 
4. Is there a dedicated function providing administrative and/or professional 
support to the Board? 
5. If yes, 
a. what is the name of this function (eg. Office of the Chair of the Board, 
Board Secretariat, etc) 
b. Please indicate the number of staff, staff titles, annual budget, 
responsibilities, etc. 
6. If there is not a dedicated function, how is support provided to the Board 
(preparation of minutes, agendas, reports, AGM support, annual report, etc)? 
7. Is there a separate board for fund raising (ie. foundation board?) 
8. If yes, do the two boards share issues and information? 
9. If yes, what mechanisms are used to facilitate the interrelationship? 
^#pn 10. How many committees of the Board are there? 
v 11. What are the committee names? 
12. Can you provide us with your board organizational chart? 
Community Input 
1. Are board meetings open to the public? 
2. Are meeting dates/locations and times publicly posted? 
3. If yes, how or where do publicly post information (ie. website, bulletin boards, 
community papers, etc) 
4. Do you publicly post agendas and minutes of Board meetings (how/where?) 
5. Does the Board consider it a priority to maintain links with community 
organizations and other stakeholders in the region? 
6. Does the Board have mechanisms or by-laws for seeking community input on 
the organization's directions, policies and services as they affect the 
community? 
7. Are community members who are not directors of the board appointed to 
serve on committees of the board? 
8. Is there a committee that focuses on community relations and community 
affairs? 
9. If yes: 
a. What is the name of this committee? 
Jtm>\ b. What is the committee's mandate and terms of reference? (please ' provide a copy if available) 
c. Do the members represent specific "communities" or "interests"? 
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f** d. Does this committee also oversee strategic alliances, affiliations, 
partnerships and other business-to-business activities? 
e. If no, does another committee oversee strategic alliances, affiliations, 
partnerships and other business-to-business activities? 
Board Orientation Program 
1. Do you have a board manual for new members? 
2. If yes, could we receive a copy of the manual (or the manual table of 
contents)? 
3. Do you have a board orientation program? 
4. If yes: 
a. how do you deliver the board orientation program? 
b. what are the main objectives of the orientation program? 
c. how often is the program offered? 
d. who maintains and delivers the orientation? 
e. how is the orientation funded? 
f. What is the cost? 
g. What type of material is in the orientation package? 
h. Could we receive a copy of your orientation package? 
5. If no, what informal processes are followed to orient new members? 
6. Do you have on-going education programs for Board members? 
7. If yes, please describe how the program is delivered and the objectives? 
jp»\ 8. Do you have a mentorship program for Board members? ' 9. Do you have a private website for board members? If yes, what material is 
posted to this site? 
10. Do you have other methods to provide information and promote 
communication between board members? 
11. Do you have anything to add that we should consider when developing a 
board orientation program? 
Conclusion 
Is there anyone else you would recommend we talk to? 
Optional Information 
This questionnaire was completed by: 
Name 
Title 
Organization 
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